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ABSTRACT
Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) is an emerging technology in
helicopter aviation. The United States Navy is evaluating its viability for use on its
helicopter fleet. HUMS uses sensors placed throughout the helicopter to monitor and
record vibration signals and numerous other aircraft operating parameters. This thesis
evaluates the vibration signals recorded by a HUMS system using a statistical technique
called tree-structured classification. The goal of the analysis is to demonstrate the
technique's ability to predict the presence of faulted components in the transmission of the
SH-60B autonomously operated in a Helicopter Transmission Test Facility at Naval Air
Warfare Center, Trenton, New Jersey. The analysis is implemented in the statistical
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States Navy is currently evaluating a technology called Health and
Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) which should prove capable of improving helicopter
safety and reliability. It uses airframe-mounted sensors to monitor and record vibrations,
flight control positions, and other parameters; these sensors are used to display
information to the aviator and the ground maintenance crew regarding the aircraft
operation, usage, and health. The HUMS system is being tested at Naval Air Warfare
Center (NAWC), Trenton, New Jersey. It is mounted on a full scale SH-60 power drive
system test bed called the Helicopter Transmission Test Facility (HTTF).
The HTTF can accommodate 32 accelerometers that collect raw vibration data for
each data acquisition. In a single acquisition, it collects raw data from every available
accelerometer in the system. The resulting raw data is processed by proprietary algorithms
of the B.F. Goodrich Company. These algorithms, developed under contract are believed
to give indications of faults in components of the helicopter power drive system. The
outputs from these algorithms are 'indicators' that in some cases should characterize the
location of a component with a fault and the type of fault that it has experienced.
The HTTF in Trenton has been operating with the intent of building a database of
"vibration signatures" for various component failures in the drive train. Data has been
collected from the HTTF using components that were all believed to be good in order to
establish a baseline vibration signature for each component. In addition, extensive "seeded
fault" testing has been accomplished. This means that defective components are placed in
the transmission so as to observe their behavior.
The challenge of interpreting the data provided by this HUMS system is to
determine which, if any, components are faulty. Tree-structured classification is a
statistical method that provides a means of interpreting this data. The technique is
analogous to normal or generalized linear regression in that it attempts to predict the value
of a dependent variable based on the value of a set of independent variables.
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This thesis uses data from the input pinion in the intermediate gearbox of the
HTTF and develops models using tree-structured classification to predict its physical
condition. The data was acquired from two sensors physically located near the gear of
interest. These models predict accurately within the confines of the available data. Their
ability to predict beyond the data, however, may be marginal. This is not unexpected and
does not imply a flaw in the methodology. It is more a problem of having relevant data to
which to apply the method. This is demonstrated in the thesis by applying data from an
operational aircraft to the models developed from the HTTF data.
Currently, the NAWC Trenton HTTF is the best source of data for applying this
method and developing models to predict failure in aircraft components. The ability to
insert faulted components into an operational transmission enables NAWC Trenton to
develop and maintain a rich data set for tree-structured classification. A better source of
data would obviously be data from the aircraft itself Although data is available from the
aircraft, it is of little value in characterizing the structure of faulted components. For
obvious reasons, little data exists in which a faulted component is flown in an operational
aircraft. Without such data, models that accurately differentiate between good and faulted
parts may be difficult to develop.
Further research is necessary to fully investigate the usefulness of tree-structured
classification in HUMS. Analysis similar to the type done in this thesis should be done on
numerous other gears, bearings and shafts in the HTTF. The models developed through
this research will help determine the usefulness of this type of analysis to HUMS.
This thesis demonstrates the usefulness of tree-structured classification in HUMS
research. Still much needs to be done to prove its ability to accurately predict faults in
operational aircraft. Since HUMS is in its infancy, it is reasonable to believe that
methodology similar to that contained in this thesis will assist in its development and
implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy is currently evaluating a technology which should prove
capable of improving helicopter safety and reliability. This technology, widely known as
Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS), has been tested and implemented in the
United Kingdom for use in helicopter operations in the North Sea. The United States
Navy is developing HUMS to increase safety of aircraft operation and improve the
efficiency of maintenance.
HUMS technology uses airframe-mounted sensors to monitor and record
vibrations, flight control positions, and other parameters; these are used to display
information to the aviator and the ground maintenance crew regarding the aircraft
operation, usage, and health. Concurrent testing is being conducted at Helicopter Anti-
submarine Squadron, Light - 41 (HSL-41) at Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island,
California, Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), Trenton, New Jersey and NAS Patuxent
River, Maryland.
The debate in the development of an emerging technology centers around
contrasting the benefits of the system with its costs and limitations. A discussion of some
benefits and limitations will serve to introduce HUMS and its potential usefulness to the
United States Navy.
A. BENEFITS OF HUMS
The ultimate goal of HUMS is to provide improved information regarding the
health and usage of an aircraft, which may provide extraordinary improvements in aircraft
safety and maintenance. In addition to fiscal savings, HUMS may dramatically increase
the operational capabilities of an aviation unit through increased and predictable aircraft
availability and survivability.
1. Safety
Safety is a primary consideration in evaluating the benefits of a system that
provides this information concerning the health of an aircraft. All aircraft mishaps are
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evaluated based on five possible causal factors; supervisory, aircrew, facilities, material,
and maintenance. Of all class "A" 1 mishaps occurring during fiscal years 1991 through
1995, thirty-two percent had material as a causal factor, and sixteen percent had
maintenance as a causal factor [Ref 1]. Both of these areas are targeted for improvement
with the implementation ofHUMS.
If accurate HUMS information were available, an aircraft would never be flown
with a potentially hazardous condition. In March of 1996, an AH-1W experienced a tail
rotor failure and crashed, killing both pilots. The maintenance records revealed damage to
the tail rotor during an earlier towing evolution on the flight line. The tail rotor and
trunnion were removed and replaced, but the yoke was only visually inspected for damage.
The inspection revealed no damage, but after the mishap it was hypothesized that it had
experienced a stress risor during the towing incident. It was presumed that this weakness
in the yoke eventually gave way to failure, causing the mishap. [Ref. 2] This is a dramatic
example of the type of failure that should be detected by a health monitoring system.
This mishap might have been avoided with a reliable HUMS. The value of human
life and the increase in effectiveness of a crew confident in its aircraft combine to intensify
the value of HUMS. This, along with the cost of replacing airframes, aircrew, and the
savings from fewer mishap investigations all combine to make the issue of safety a prime
motivation in developing a reliable HUMS system.
2. Maintenance
Another source of potential savings is the improved capabilities of maintenance
personnel furnished with HUMS information. Currently, critical components are
inspected, removed, or replaced according to a time schedule usually based on the flight
hours they have experienced. This time schedule is understandably very conservative,
ensuring that the "weakest" component of any lot will be replaced prior to its failure. This
method results in countless removals and replacements of perfectly good components.
1 A class "A" mishap is one that results in fatality, aircraft destruction, or damage over $1,000,000
[Ref. 3].
Many safeguards are in place to ensure the correctness and completeness of
maintenance performed on Navy and Marine Corps helicopters. For critical component
maintenance, an action is performed, inspected and checked for quality assurance. This
process requires a minimum of three individuals. Once the maintenance action is
performed and inspected, the paperwork must be reviewed by Maintenance Control, a
"safe-for-flight" authority, and finally, the pilot. Clearly, with the safeguards integrated
into the system, maintenance performed on the helicopters is predictably safe. However,
risk remains every time any maintenance is performed. This risk is manifested in two
ways.
First, there is no guarantee of the relative health of the new component. Since the
original component is being removed based on a time schedule, there is no reliable means
of determining its health. All that is known is that it was operating when it was removed.
The new component is likely to be a functioning component, as it has been subjected to
tests of its own. However, it is occasionally the case that a faulty component is delivered
from supply. This bad component may be swapped for a perfectly good component at the
expense of the cost of the component plus many man-hours to perform and inspect the
maintenance.
The second manifestation of risk is that of improper maintenance. As discussed
before, there are necessary inspections and re-inspections of critical component
maintenance. There remains, however, the risk of error every time maintenance is
performed. Every time a bolt is tightened, for example, there is a potential for over-
torquing that bolt. This error may or may not be caught by the quality assurance process.
Humans make mistakes and this risk factor will never be eliminated.
With the implementation of a reliable HUMS, only necessary maintenance would
be performed. This implementation should extend the usable life of many components
without sacrificing reliability. The savings of fewer component replacements, and the
reduced risks of only performing maintenance when necessary, are compelling arguments
illustrating the benefit ofHUMS to the maintenance efforts of an aviation unit.
3. Operational Availability
The goal of an operational aviation unit is to have aircraft available to fly for a
scheduled operation or in response to any unplanned contingency. HUMS provides the
means for a unit to effectively accomplish this goal. Ultimately, through improved safety,
efficient maintenance, and improved logistic support, an aviation unit will be able to meet
its operational requirements in an efficient, cost-effective manner.
B. LIMITATIONS OF HUMS
The realities of the state of HUMS technology is evident in the difficulties
encountered by the companies in the United Kingdom currently implementing HUMS. In
the United Kingdom, HUMS systems are employed on helicopters transporting workers to
and from oil platforms in the North Sea. Two of the difficulties encountered as HUMS is
implemented are data quality and false alarms. The success in United Kingdom HUMS
usage has been not in its technical performance, but rather in public relations. In some
instances, "HUMS" is painted on the side of helicopters incorporating the system to
reassure the passengers of the safety and reliability of the aircraft. Though the passengers
feel safe, due to these difficulties, the true margin of safety benefit may be negligible.
[Ref 4]
1. Data Quality
The strength of HUMS is its ability to acquire data and use it to determine the
health of critical components. The confidence in the system can only be as high as the
confidence in the quality of the data. The data collected by HUMS ranges from vibrations
of individual gears, shafts, and bearings in the transmission to the positions of the flight
controls in the cockpit. The integrity of the data relies on the maintenance level of
accelerometers, flight position indicators, and many other HUMS components including
hundreds of feet of cabling. The dependence on data quality begins in the developmental
stages of the technology, and extends to its implementation.
In the developmental stages of the technology, the quality of the data determines
the quality of the technology itself. If the technology is developed around poor data, then
it will perform poorly. This idea extends to the implementation ofHUMS. The quality of
the data that is acquired in the implementation of HUMS must be maintained. The
reliability of an operational HUMS depends on the quality of the data.
Along with the issue of data quality comes the question of data maintenance. In
evaluating the health of certain components, HUMS makes a determination in one of two
ways. The data for the component may exceed a defined limit called a threshold, or it
might exceed a limit based on its trends. In order for this trending capability to be
effective, the data for each specific component must be archived and carried along with it
as it is removed and replaced on the same or another aircraft. Each critical component, as
well as each aircraft, must maintain its own database for HUMS to be effective. Vibration
and rotor analysis, as being developed in HUMS, is complicated and its implementation
must be carefully planned and monitored. [Ref 4]
2. Errors
The most notable shortcoming of the United Kingdom HUMS system is the
propensity for erroneous indications. There are several types of errors that can occur in a
HUMS system. The most obvious are the false positive indication (false alarm) and the
false negative indication. A false alarm occurs when HUMS indicates that a healthy
component has experienced some sort of fault. The false negative is a more dangerous
error in that HUMS fails to give warning in the case of a faulty component.
a. False Alarms
It is not uncommon in United Kingdom companies using HUMS equipped
helicopters to have eighty percent or more of the fleet in exceedance of a HUMS
threshold, indicating that those aircraft are not flight ready [Ref. 4]. These threshold
values are predetermined limits set on specific components monitored by HUMS. That
eighty percent of the fleet that is in exceedance normally does not have any faulted
components. Instead, the cause of the exceedance is that a conservatively low threshold
value was set. This problem puts the United Kingdom oil companies in a situation where
decisions must be made concerning the safety of their aircraft. They must either ignore the
HUMS indications and fly their aircraft under the exceedance, or they must endure
excessive maintenance demands and reduced operational availability due to the required
inspections. In either case, HUMS is burdening the helicopter operations by either
reducing confidence in the aircraft, or requiring excessive maintenance and inspections.
There are several causes of the excessive false alarm rate. The most
obvious, and the one with the most potential for corrective action, is the setting of the
thresholds. The question of where a threshold should be set is a central issue of debate in
HUMS development. A threshold is a value set for a specific component of the aircraft
that is monitored by a HUMS sensor. The HUMS sensor takes a reading from the
component and compares the value of the reading to the threshold value. If it exceeds the
threshold, the component is flagged as faulty. The challenge is to set the threshold value
low enough that if a component is faulty, it will be detected, but high enough to avoid
flagging good components as faulty.
b. False Negative Indication
A false negative indication is when HUMS gives no warning of a fault
when there actually is a fault present. Setting the threshold value appropriately is a major
consideration in eliminating the false negative indication error. This error is the more
dangerous of the two types of errors discussed. Detecting and warning of faulted
components is the basis for HUMS development. If this type of error is not manageable,
then the concept ofHUMS is not worth pursuing
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis will focus on analyzing the data from a developmental HUMS at
NAWC, Trenton; Chapter II will describe this system. Chapter III will describe
Classification Trees, a non-parametric technique used to uncover structure in a data set. It
will also discuss specifically how the data acquired from a helicopter transmission test bed
is modeled using this technique. Chapter IV will present the results of the analysis and
describe the specific models used. Using the models and their output, Chapter V will
discuss their possible usefulness and areas of further study.
H. BACKGROUND
A. HIDS DESCRIPTION
The system being tested at NAWC, Trenton is a HUMS called Helicopter
Integrated Diagnostic System (HIDS). HTDS testing uses a test bed with a full scale
Helicopter Transmission Test Facility (HTTF) consisting of the entire SH-60 power drive
system.
The HTTF can accommodate up to 32 accelerometers that simultaneously sense
the vibration signals of all the components that are "near" at a rate of 100,000 samples per
second. In this context, "near" means that the accelerometer can detect the signal of any
component that has an accessible path from which vibration signals can be sensed. A
single component may be "near" more than one accelerometer. [Ref. 5]
B. AVAILABLE DATA
The accelerometers collect raw vibration data for up to thirty seconds per
acquisition. In a single acquisition, HIDS will collect data from every available
accelerometer in the system. Most acquisitions require between four and ten seconds to
record a complete vibration signature from all of the monitored components.
In the Trenton HTTF, six data sets are usually acquired per test run. The first is
with cold oil at low power settings. The second is with hot oil at the maximum power
setting. The remaining four data sets are acquired with hot oil varying the power setting
evenly between maximum and minimum. Ambient cell temperature can also be varied
between zero and forty degrees Celsius. [Ref. 5]
The resulting raw data is processed by proprietary algorithms of the B.F. Goodrich
Company. These algorithms, developed under contract, are believed to give indications of
faults in components of the helicopter power drive system.
C. INDICATORS
The outputs from these algorithms are "indicators" that in some cases should
characterize the failing component and the type of fault that the component has
experienced. These indicators are proprietary in nature and will not be discussed in detail
in this thesis. In general terms, the indicators compute statistical measures from the raw
data describing certain characteristics of the vibration signal and various types of energy
emitted from the component.
Components of the power train are categorized into three separate classes: gears,
shafts, and bearings. A different set of indicators is computed and recorded for each type
of component. For example, gears have associated with them one set of computed
indicators, while shafts and bearings have different sets of indicators associated with them.
An example of an indicator is "roller bearing energy." This indicator is computed for
each component at every sensor that can "see" that component. In other words, roller
bearing energy is computed for a single component every time it is detected by a sensor.
For a single acquisition, the roller bearing energy of a component is recorded the same
number of times as there are sensors that "see" it.
D. DATA COLLECTION
The indicator data has been provided in Matlab format. Each acquisition results in
three Matlab matrices, one each for gears, bearings, and shafts. The matrices contain the
computed indicators for each component/sensor combination that maintains a path of
transmissibility. From these matrices, any indicator from any component/sensor
combination can be isolated and evaluated.
The HTTF in Trenton has been operating with the intent of building a database of
vibration signatures for various component failures in the drive train. There are currently
over 900 data acquisitions, some lasting up to 30 seconds, but in most cases lasting
between four and ten seconds. Data has been collected from the HTTF using components
that were all believed to be good in order to establish a baseline vibration signature for
each component. In addition, extensive "seeded fault" testing has been accomplished.
This means that defective components are placed in the transmission to observe their
behavior. The HTTF employs defective components oftwo distinct types.
The first type of failure is the fleet rejected component failure. These components
have faults discovered during routine organizational, intermediate, or depot-level
maintenance. They are delivered to NAWC, Trenton for evaluation on the HTTF and then
returned. These components are beneficial for demonstrating the characteristics of failures
actually occurring in fleet aircraft. The limited availability of these components demands
an alternate source of component failure for evaluation on the HTTF.
The second type of failure fulfills this requirement. These failures are the result of
intentionally damaging otherwise good components. An example of this would be
removing a portion of a tooth from a particular gear. These components are easily
attainable and since they do not have to be returned, are available for extensive analysis.
They provide the experimenters with the flexibility to focus their analysis in an organized
way. The realism of using components damaged in operational aircraft is sacrificed in
order to attain the convenience and flexibility that this type of component failure provides.
In order to achieve the goals established for HUMS, the data collected from a
system like HEDS must provide definitive solutions to the problem of determining the
health of components in the SH-60 power drive system. Simply stated, the challenge of




1. Overview of Tree-Structured Classification
Tree-structured classification is a statistical method that builds classification trees
to uncover structure in a data set. It is an exploratory technique that is analogous to
normal or generalized linear regression in that it attempts to predict the value of a
dependent variable based on the value of a set of independent variables. If the dependent
variable in the data set of interest is categorical, the tree grown by this method is called a
classification tree. If the dependent variable is continuous, then the tree is called a
regression tree.
The advantages of tree-structured classification over more familiar regression
techniques are its ease of interpretation, its ability to handle multiple responses, and its
ability to handle a mix of categorical and continuous independent variables. There are
other advantages which make this technique a flexible alternative to regression. Because it
is a non-parametric technique, the assumptions that must be made about the data are
reduced and the applicability of the model is generalized. It is insensitive to monotone
transformations of the independent variables. This eliminates the exploratory attempts to
improve the model by transforming the independent variables. [Ref. 6]
2. Medical Example
Tree-structured classification is useful in the medical profession for identifying
patients who are at high risk of death. By way of introduction to tree-structured
classification, a medical example adapted from Breiman et al. (1984) is presented.
Patients who enter a hospital following a heart attack exhibit a wide range of
variability in their propensity for recovery. A physician, with knowledge about what
characteristics influence a patient's ability to recover, is able to allocate the proper
resources to those patients who are at higher risk of death. The data set used in this
example consists of 215 patients who checked into a hospital following a heart attack and
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survived more than 24 hours. Of these 215 patients, 37 died within 30 days of admission,
and 178 did not. The 178 "survivors" are called class "live" and the 37 "early deaths" are
called class "die."
In tree-structured classification, each data point is called a "case." In this example
each patient represents a different case who falls into either class "live" or "die." They
also exhibit certain characteristics that a physician hopes will predict their likelihood of
surviving at least 30 days after admission to the hospital. These characteristics are the
independent variables used by the tree-structured classification.
For the example, the variables have been limited to those that have been shown to
characterize this longevity. The first variable associated with each patient is the minimum
systolic blood pressure over the 24-hour period following admission to the hospital. This
is a continuous variable ranging over all possible blood pressure measurements. The
second variable is the patient's age. This is a continuous variable measured in years. The
final variable is the presence of sinus tachycardia. This is a categorical variable with levels
of "true" and "false." By definition, sinus tachycardia is present if the sinus node heart
rate exceeds 100 beats per minute during the first 24 hours following admission to the
hospital; the sinus node is the normal electrical pacemaker of the heart and is located in
the right atrium. [Ref. 7]
Tree-structured classification is an iterative procedure that attempts to separate all
the cases of a data set into nodes of a binary tree that are "pure." By definition, "pure"
means that all the cases in a single node have exactly the same realization in the dependent
variable. In the medical example, a "pure" node would be one where all the patients in
that node either survived at least 30 days, or all died within 30 days.
The root node of this binary classification tree contains all the cases in the data set.
From this node, a determination is made regarding a split of the data into two separate
"child" nodes. At each node the tree algorithm searches throughM independent variables
one by one, beginning with jc, and continuing up to xM . For our example, M = 3 and
x, = "systolic pressure," x2 = "age," and x3 = "tachycardia." At each variable it
evaluates the change in purity (in a sense to be discussed later) if all the cases in that node
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were split based on each possible value of that variable. A split is chosen at a specific
value, j, of a single independent variable, Xi . The right child node gets all cases for which
Xj > j and the left child node gets all cases for which x
t
< j . Considering the data at the
root node of our medical example, the algorithm evaluates every possible split of the
cases, and picks the split that gives the greatest improvement in purity. It first checks the
systolic blood pressure variable. It evaluates the change in purity for splits made between
distinct values of systolic blood pressure observed in the data set. It then does the same
for the splits made between distinct values of observed age. Finally, it looks at the
presence of sinus tachycardia. It evaluates the change in purity if a split were made
between the cases where sinus tachycardia was present, and those where it was not. From
all the possible splits, the algorithm chooses the one that gives the greatest improvement in
purity. [Ref. 7]
The splitting rule implemented in S-plus (Mathsoft Inc., 1995) departs slightly
from the recursive partitioning methods discussed in Breiman et al. (1984). S-plus uses
the deviance (likelihood statistic) to measure the "purity" of the node. Every node has a
measure of impurity called deviance. At each node / of a classification tree, the vector
fj,.
= (pn ,...,pik ) is the probability distribution over the k classes. Each case in node /' is
assumed to be drawn from a multinomial distribution with parameter ^ . At node i,
n
ik
cases are observed in class k, where 2^ nik - n, The deviance at a node is defined as
k
the negative of twice the log-likelihood,
A = -22X loSA*
k
Since we do not know the probabilities, we must estimate ju, for node i,
Now, consider splitting the cases from node / into two child nodes / and r. The split








is maximized, (since a decrease in deviance means an increase in purity) [Ref. 8]
Using the data from the medical example, we compute the deviance of the root
node as an illustration. As previously stated, there are two classes of patients, "live" or
"die." Thus, each case in the root node is assumed to be drawn from a multinomial
distribution with k = 2. If //,=(/?,, /?]2 ) , then pu = prob{'live'} and pn = prob{'die'} .
At the root node, there are a total of n
x
= 215 cases, «,, = 178 with level "live" and
178 „ 37
t\ 2 = 37 with level "die," giving pu =ttt and pn =T~T, and the deviance at the root
*— 1 -' *» 1 J
node is equal to
178 37
-2[1781n + 371n 1 = 197.45
215 215 J
The first split of the cases in the example is made on systolic pressure. The split is
made such that all the cases with systolic pressure less than 92.5 go to the left child node
and all the cases with systolic pressure greater than 92.5 go to the right child node. The
split results in n
2
= 20 cases in the left node and n
3
= 195 cases in the right node. Of the
20 cases in the left node, tt,, = 6 have the level "live" and n^ = 14 have the level "die."
Of the 195 cases in the right node, «
31
= 172 have the level "live" and nS2 = 23 have the
level "die." The resultant deviance is the sum of the deviance of the two child nodes,
6 14 23 172
-2[61n— + 141n—]-2[231n + 1721n ] = 165.93,L 20 20 J L 195 195 J
which is smaller than the deviance of the root node (and is the smallest possible across all
possible splits).
Each split of a node results in a tree which is more pure in the dependent variable.
The purity of the tree is defined by the deviance of the tree,
j
wherej is the set of all nodes on which splits have not yet been made. This set of nodes
iscalled the "leaf nodes." A "terminal node" is a leaf node on which no further splits are
made. [Ref. 8]
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If a tree is allowed to grow until each terminal node contains only one case, then it
has a total deviance of zero, perfectly characterizing the structure of the data. This tree,
however, may be worthless for predicting the classification of new data not found in the
data set used to grow the tree, analogous to the regression situation of using n data points
to fit a linear model with n unknown coefficients.
A set of stopping criteria is in place to ensure that over-fitting of the data is not
carried to this extreme. Even though an over-sized tree may be useless for predicting new
data, the tree must be allowed to grow sufficiently large to uncover all relevant structure.
Failure to grow the tree sufficiently may leave significant structure uncovered. The idea is
to grow the tree larger than desired and then "prune" it back to one that is useful in
predicting classifications of new data. Figure 1 is the over-sized tree grown from the
medical data prior to any pruning.
The interpretation of the tree graph is relatively simple. Each node is labeled with
the level of the dependent variable that characterizes the majority of the cases in that node.
For instance, since 178 of the 215 patients did live at least thirty days, the root node of
figure one has the label "live." This indicates that the majority of the patients in that node
had the level "live" as their dependent variable.
Below each terminal node of the graph is the misclassification rate of the cases in
that node with respect to its node label. For instance, the root node is labeled "live," but,
in fact, 37 of the 215 cases in the root node actually died within the first 30 days.
Therefore, the misclassification rate under the root node reads 37/215.
The labels on the arcs of the tree is the variable on which the split of the cases was
made. The first split of the cases occurred on systolic pressure. All those who had
systolic pressure less than 92.5 were split into the left node, and all those who had systolic
pressure greater than 92.5 were split into the right node 1 .
1 The comparison of an independent variable is always evaluated as greater than or less than the value
chosen to split the data. The implementation of classification trees always chooses candidate splits of an
independent variable between distinct values of the individual cases. There is no possibility of an
independent variable having a value equal to a value of its candidate split. For example, if there was a
patient with systolic blood pressure of 92.5, then a different splitting value would have been chosen.
[Ref.6]
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Figure 1 . Over-Sized Tree Grown for Medical Example
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The terminal nodes of the tree are represented by square boxes. These terminal
nodes are labeled with the level of the dependent variable corresponding to the level of the
majority of the cases in that node. Ideally, all the cases in a terminal node would have a
misclassification rate of zero. For a "pure" node containing n cases either all n are "live"
or all n are "die." The likelihood function p",/?°
2
= /?"and pn = — = 1 so the deviance is
n
-2[«lnl] = 0. Since real data rarely behaves ideally, growing a tree where all terminal
nodes are pure is uncommon.
Methods are provided by S-Plus to reduce the size of the tree to the "right size."
The method used to determine the "right size" is called cross-validation, and will be
discussed later in this chapter. The method provided to implement cross-validation is
called "pruning." This method takes a tree model as required input, and reduces it in size
according to a cost-complexity parameter that may be changed by the user.
The output of the pruning method implemented in S-plus is either a single pruned
tree if the cost-complexity parameter is given, or a series of pruned trees based on a
sequence of cost-complexity parameters. This series of pruned trees is what the cross-
validation method uses to determine the right-sized tree.
The pruning method determines the deviance (or impurity) of the trees ranging in
size from the over-sized tree, to the tree consisting of only the root node. The deviance in
the pruning method is actually the sum of the deviance of the tree plus a weighted penalty
for the size of the tree, which is the number of terminal nodes of the tree; the weight is
called the cost-complexity parameter. It is intuitive that as the size of the tree increases,
the purity of the tree will also increase. Figure 2 shows the results from pruning the full

















































Figure 2. Pruning Sequence for Medical Example
There is a point in the process where the benefit of increased purity is countered by
a tree's inability to accurately predict the response of cases not used to actually grow the
tree. Cross-validation is a way of determining the size of tree that optimizes both the
purity of the tree and its ability to predict from new data.
Cross-validation uses pruning to determine the "right-sized" tree. If the data set is
sufficiently large, then part of the data can be used to grow the tree, and the remaining
data used to check for the tree's ability to accurately classify it. Cross-validation is a
method used in the case where the size of the data set is not large enough to hold back
data in order to check for its predictive accuracy.
Ten-fold cross validation takes the complete data set and partitions it into ten
nearly equal sets. Each set is removed in turn; then the remaining nine tenths are used to
grow an over-sized tree. The over-sized tree is pruned as previously discussed, resulting
in a sequence of pruned trees similar to Figure 2. The one-tenth of the data that was
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removed prior to growing the tree is then applied to that specific sequence of pruned trees
to test its predictive accuracy. The deviance from the cases applied to each of the pruned
trees in the sequence is recorded.
The procedure is performed nine more times for each of the unique partitions of
the data set. When this is finished, there are ten deviances recorded for each size in the
sequence of pruned tree. Cross-validation plots the minimum deviance from all ten trees
at each size in the sequence. In general, as the size of a tree increases, the deviance also
decreases, until a point at which the size of the tree is so large that it loses its predictive
ability. This minimum point of deviance is the determination of the "right-sized" tree.





















Figure 3. Cross-validation plot for Medical Example
Cross-validation gives the best size for a tree based on the given data. From this
information, a tree is grown from the entire data set and pruned back to the appropriate
size. This tree becomes the model from which exploration of the structure of the data can
begin. Figure 3 clearly shows that a tree of five or six nodes is the appropriate size for this
19
set of data, since the deviance reaches its minimum at these points. Figure 4 is the plot of
a tree that has been fully grown and then pruned back to a five node tree, based on the










Figure 4. Tree Grown From Medical Data Pruned to Five Nodes
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B. CLASSIFYING HTTF DATA
For the analysis in this thesis, data is taken from a single component of the NAWC,
Trenton HTTF: the input pinion in the intermediate gearbox. The input pinion is a gear in
the intermediate gearbox that accepts rotational power from the main gearbox in the
transmission and redirects it toward the tail gearbox. The question being asked about the
data acquired from the HTTF is, "Can a fault be identified in a component of the
transmission, based on the indicators computed from the raw data?" This is analogous to
the medical planners who wanted to know if the probability of survival of their heart
attack victims could be predicted by the victim's age, systolic blood pressure, and the
presence of sinus tachycardia. The dependent variable in this case is the physical state of
the input pinion. It is a categorical variable with levels or classes consisting of all possible
conditions of that component. The independent variables are the indicators, as discussed in
Chapter II, computed for the vibrations detected by each sensor able to see the input
pinion. Out of all the acquisitions taken from the HTTF, 640 were available for this
analysis. These acquisitions were taken from 1 December 1994 to 3 January 1997.
The dependent variable is a single variable with up to four levels. Of the 640
acquisitions, 396 had no faults in the intermediate gear box input pinion. These
acquisitions are variables of the first level called "no fault," and are considered to be the
baseline data. The second level is "edm fault." An edm fault is a machined slit made in a
tooth of the pinion. Of the remaining 244 acquisitions, 186 had this fault. The purpose of
the edm is to propagate a crack in the gear from the weakness in that area of the tooth.
The input pinion was not responding to a single edm slit, so three slits were made to
intensify the progress. Another 36 acquisitions had this fault and are variables with the
third level "edmthree fault." The fourth possible level for the dependent variable is "tooth
fault " This fault is caused by intentionally removing one-third of a tooth in the input
pinion. There are 22 acquisitions with this fault. All of these faults are a result of
intentionally corrupting the otherwise flight-ready component.
Two accelerometers are attached to the intermediate gearbox that act as vibration
sensors for the input pinion. For each sensor, 38 indicators are computed for the vibration
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signals received from the single input pinion. These 76 indicators are all included as
independent variables in the analysis.
Four other parameters were measured and used as independent variables. During
some of the data acquisitions, the HTTF was operating only one engine. This is recorded
and used as a categorical independent variable with three levels (both operating, starboard
operating, or port operating). Another independent variable is the time between data
acquisitions which provides information about the temperature of the system oil. Finally,
the last two independent variables are the values of the main and the tail rotor torque.
These give an indication of the power applied to the system. When the tail rotor is not
active, a tail rotor torque of zero is recorded. Even though the gears are spinning, there is
no torque applied to the tail rotor transmission. Since the intermediate gear box transfers
power from the main gear box to the tail rotor gear box, the implications of zero torque
on the tail rotor are significant. In all, this gives 80 independent variables for the single
categorical dependent variable. Appendix A contains a sample set ofthe data used.
The goal of the tree-based classification model is to predict the physical state of
the intermediate gear box input pinion based on the independent variables. Several
different models may be developed from the same data set. After determining the possible
models, a determination of the "best" model must be made and subsequently interpreted.
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IV. RESULTS
The applicability of tree-structured classification to HUMS research is dependent
on the way the data set is structured with regards to its dependent variable. The data can
be configured in several different ways depending on what structure needs to be
uncovered in the analysis. For instance, the data contains four different states defined as
the classes. Each class corresponds to the physical state of the component of interest
during a particular acquisition or case. Since the goal of the study at NAWC Trenton is to
determine if faults can be detected, then it is reasonable to assume that each of the states
that correspond to any type of fault could be aggregated into a single state called "fault."
All of the baseline data would fall into a second state called "no fault."
Other possibilities exist in defining the state variables. While the previous example
determined the presence of any fault, a second approach is to determine the presence of
each type of fault known to be present in the data set. In the case of the data obtained for
the input pinion, a dependent variable is defined as either "no," "edm," "edmthree," or
"tooth." This type of analysis adds another level of error not present in the previous
"fault" / "no fault" example. This structure of the dependent variable is subject to three
types of errors. As discussed in Chapter I, the first two error types are the false positives
and the false negatives. A third type of error introduced with this structure is the error of
fault misclassification. These errors occur when the model classifies a case as one type of
fault when in fact it is a different type of fault. Although this is an error, it is the least
costly error assuming that the two faults have similar impact on the operational capability
of the aircraft.
The research in this thesis focuses on these two structures of the dependent
variable. Model one defines the dependent variable as a factor with four levels. It
attempts to distinguish each type of fault present as well as those that are not faulted.
Model two simplifies the definition of the dependent variable into "fault" or "no fault."
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Models were developed using the methods described in Chapter in. After
determining the target size of the trees based on a ten-fold cross-validation procedure, two
separate trees were grown. The tree for model one was grown and then pruned back to
the best eleven terminal nodes. From the 640 cases presented to the model, a total of 23
errors were made. There were 16 missed faults, 7 false alarms, and no fault
misclassifications. This tree is depicted in Figure 5.
The tree for model two was grown and then pruned back to the best twelve
terminal nodes. From the 640 cases presented to the model, a total of 20 errors were
made. There were 13 missed faults and 7 false alarms. This tree is depicted in Figure 6.
Appendix B contains detailed S-plus output from all the tree models developed. Table 1
summarizes the trees developed using cross-validation.
MODEL 1: Dependent Variable: "Fault," "EDM," "EDMTHREE," "Tooth"
MODEL 2: Dependent Variable: "Fault," "No Fault"
Model
Overall
Misclassification Rate Missed Faults False Alarms
Misclassification
ofFaults
1 .0359 16 4 3
2 .0313 13 7 N/A
Table 1 . Summary of Trees from Cross-Validation
In analyzing the two trees, it was discovered that they were both sensitive to the
data used to build them. For instance, a tree grown using a random ninety percent sample
of the data could significantly vary from a tree grown from a different sample of the same
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Figure 5. Model One Tree Pruned to Eleven Nodes
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Figure 6. Model Two Tree Pruned to Twelve Nodes
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one that is better than the other. It is not clear that the tree grown and pruned back to the
size suggested by cross-validation necessarily results in the "best" tree. The "best" tree is
one that has a small misclassification rate, while maintaining a small error rate in predicting
data not used to grow the tree.
2. Heuristic Method
To determine the stability of the tree models, a heuristic method was developed
using functions available in S-plus. The heuristic method simply builds multiple tree
models using various configurations of the data. From the different models, a best tree is
determined. The code used to implement this method is found in Appendix C.
The procedures for the heuristic method are simple. A random sample is taken
from each level of the dependent variable. For model one, a random sample was taken
from the levels corresponding to each type of fault. For model two, a random sample was
taken from the levels corresponding to "fault" or "no fault." Initially, this was a random
sample consisting of half of the data in each level of the dependent variable. Using model
two as an example, a random sample of 198 cases from the 396 "no fault" cases, and 122
cases from the 244 "fault" cases was drawn. From these 320 cases, a tree was grown and
then pruned back to the size suggested by a two-fold cross-validation, since only half of
the data is used. In the case of model two, this target size is eight terminal nodes. The
remaining 320 cases not used to build the tree were applied to the model which resulted in
a prediction misclassification rate.
Two methods were used to determine the "best" tree. The first was to simply use
the misclassification rate from the remaining cases applied to the tree. This is called the
prediction misclassification rate (PMR). The PMR is attained by applying the cases held
out from the building of the tree to the model. Each of these cases falls into a terminal
node based on its own independent variables. The PMR counts the total number
misclassified and divides it by the total number of cases applied. The tree with the smallest
PMR was kept as a candidate for the best tree.
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The second method considered the misclassification rate of the tree itself. This
misclassification rate, called the tree misclassification rate (TMR), is the misclassification
rate of those cases used to build the tree. Unless a tree is allowed to grow until all the
terminal nodes are pure, the TMR will always be greater than zero. The second method
took the average of the TMR and the PMR. The tree with the smallest average of the two
misclassification rates was also saved as a candidate for the "best" tree.
In addition to the trees built using half of the data, trees were built using ninety
percent of the data. The same procedures were followed as the trees built using fifty
percent of the data. In model two, a random sample of 356 cases from the 396 "no fault"
cases, and 219 cases from the 244 "fault" cases was drawn. The trees were grown and
pruned back to the size suggested by a ten-fold cross-validation. In the case of model
two, this target size is twelve terminal nodes. The remaining ten percent of the data were
applied to the tree, and the misclassification rates were computed. The same criteria were
used to determine the "best" tree from the models using the 90/10 split of the data as were
used for the models using a 50/50 split of the data.
This method was applied 1000 times for each configuration of the dependent
variable. For the tree grown during each iteration, two measures of goodness were
considered. These measures of goodness are the misclassification rate from the predicted
data, and the average of the misclassification rates from the tree and the predicted data.
When the 1000 iterations were complete, there were four tree models from each of the
two configurations of the dependent variable. In all, eight trees were kept in order to
make an evaluation of the "best" tree for each configuration of the dependent variable.
B. HEURISTIC MODEL SELECTION
These eight trees are broken into sets of four for comparison. Each group
represents the four best trees using a particular separation of the data used to build the
model. They are further distinguished by the measure used to determine the "best" tree.
Table 2 summarizes the four trees kept from the data in model one.
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MODEL 1











50/50 averaging .0188 .0563 15 9
50/50 PMR .0406 .0469 22 4 2
90/10 averaging .0383 .0151 16 4 3
90/10 PMR .0383 .0151 16 4 3
Table 2. Summary of Best Trees from Model One Data
As is expected, the variability in the TMR from the trees grown from fifty percent
of the data is greater than that of those grown from ninety percent of the data. Because
ninety percent of the data is used for each tree, the best tree is determined using the
averaging measure or the PMR method. Since only ten percent of the data is held back
for use in prediction, the trees with the 90/10 split achieve a much smaller PMR. The
trees found using the 90/10 split are, in fact, the same tree. The tree depicted in Figure 5
is identical with regard to the variables used to build it. This is reassuring and suggests
stability in the cross-validation procedure as outlined in Chapter III.
In selecting the best tree for model one, consideration was given to the relative
importance of the different types of errors seen by the different trees. If missed faults are
considered the most undesirable error followed by false alarms and then misclassification
of faults, then either of the trees grown from the 90/10 split appear to be the best tree for
model one. The tree is depicted in Figure 7. Even though the tree grown from the 50/50
split using averaging only has 1 5 missed faults, the large number of false alarms rule it out
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Figure 7. Model One Tree Selected From Heuristic Method
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The four trees from model two are the result of applying the 1000 iterations to the
data. They are summarized in table 3.
MODEL 2




of Goodness TMR PMR Missed Faults False Alarms
50/50 averaging .0062 .0656 13 10
50/50 PMR .0313 .0438 14 10
90/10 averaging .0300 0.0 10 7
90/10 PMR .0330 0.0 12 7
Table 3. Summary of Best Trees from Model Two Data
Again, the variability in the TMR from the trees grown from fifty percent of the data is
greater than that of those grown from ninety percent of the data. The same relationships
between the split of the data and the values ofTMR and PMR hold for model two. With
only ten percent of the data held back, it was possible to find trees that perfectly predicted
that small number of cases. Although the trees found by using the 90/10 split are different
in this case, they are similar enough to suggest stability in the trees.
In selecting the best tree for model two, consideration was also given to the
relative importance of the different types of errors seen by the different trees. Similarly,
missed faults are considered the most undesirable error followed by false alarms. The tree
grown from the 90/10 split using averaging as the measure of goodness appears to be the
best tree for Model Two. The tree is depicted in Figure 8.
C. MODEL COMPARISON
The trees grown for the model one data are nearly identical. Figure 5 depicts the
tree grown by the ten-fold cross-validation. Figure 7 depicts the tree determined "best" by
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Figure 8. Model Two Tree Selected From Heuristic Method
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exactly identical results. Each tree misclassifies the 23 cases out of 640 while using
exactly the same independent variables as the splitting variables. The only difference
between the two trees is the value of the selected split in two instances.
The two trees for the model two data are also very similar. Figure 6 depicts the
tree grown by the ten-fold cross-validation. The total misclassification rate of this tree is
20 cases out of 640. A slight improvement was realized by finding the tree by the
heuristic method. Figure 8 depicts this tree. The independent variables used as the
splitting variable are similar, but not in the same order. This similarity shows stability in
the trees grown using both the cross-validation procedure and the heuristic method. Table
4 summarizes the comparison of the trees for both data sets.
MODEL 1: Dependent Variable: "Fault," "EDM," "EDMTHREE," "Tooth"











Cross-validation 1 .0359 16 4 3
Heuristic 1 .0359 16 4 3
Cross-validation 2 .0313 13 7 N/A
Heuristic 2 .0266 10 7 N/A
Table 4. Summary of Trees for Both Data Sets
D. MODEL APPLICATION
Because these models were developed from data in a test cell, their applicability to
aircraft data is questionable. Twenty-six acquisitions from an SH-60B Seahawk helicopter
were available to assess the accuracy of the models built from FTTTF data to actual aircraft
data. The data from the helicopter is assumed to be all no-fault data. The prediction tree
shows the misclassification rate of the twenty-six cases as they are applied to the models.
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Figure 9 is the prediction tree for the aircraft data applied to model one and Figure 10 is
the prediction tree for model two.
Model one does a mediocre job of predicting aircraft data. From the twenty-six
cases, twenty are classified correctly as "no fault." Of the remaining six cases, two are
misclassified as "edm" and four are classified as "edmthree." This is interesting because in
the test cell data, the "edmthree" faults were the most distinctive and never gave a false
alarm or a false negative indication.
Model two does a much better job of classifying the cases from the aircraft data.
Only two of the twenty-six are misclassified as a fault. Although this is not an acceptable
error rate for a HUMS system employed on an operational aircraft, it does demonstrate
potential utility for tree-structured classification in determining thresholds for HUMS.
34
RBE 1>0.9605


















/ \ / \
edm no edm no
































Figure 10. Model Two Prediction Tree From Aircraft Data
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to highlight the benefits and limitations ofHUMS in
its current state of development, and offer a methodology to begin exploring possible
improvements. The limited scope of this thesis serves as an introduction to further study
in the area of tree-structured classification applied to HUMS technology.
This thesis used data from only one gear in the HTTF and developed models to
characterize the structure of the data acquired from the two sensors near that gear. These
models perform well within the confines of the data given. As was demonstrated with the
data from the operational aircraft, the models do not necessarily provide reliable results
when applied to data from a different test platform. This illustrates the need to acquire
data that accurately characterizes that of an operational aircraft.
Currently, the NAWC Trenton HTTF is the best source of data for applying this
methodology and developing models to predict failure in aircraft components. Their
ability to insert faulted components into an operational transmission enables them to
develop and maintain a rich data set for tree-structured classification. A better source of
data would obviously be data from the aircraft itself. Although data is available from the
aircraft, it is of little value in characterizing the structure of faulted components, granted
the aircraft has only good components. For obvious reasons, little data exists in which a
faulted component is flown in an operational aircraft. Without this data, models that
accurately predict the structure of aircraft data may be difficult to develop.
A recommendation to move toward achieving this goal is installing HUMS on
more operational aircraft. An accurately maintained base of aircraft data would enhance
the capabilities of this research. Even though the majority of the data would be "no fault,"
eventually a library of data would develop in which faults were believed to have been
present in some of the acquired data. Assumptions would have to be made about when a
certain fault occurred, and which acquisitions are believed to contain that fault. These
assumptions would be determined in conjunction with the maintenance action that
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discovered the fault. As this data base of faults developed, HUMS may become more
accurate and begin predicting these faults.
Further research is necessary to fully investigate the usefulness of tree-structured
classification in HUMS. Analysis similar to the type done in this thesis should be done on
numerous other gears, bearings and shafts in the HTTF. The models developed through
this research will help determine the usefulness of this type of analysis to HUMS.
In addition to further model development, there exists a need to continue to
acquire data from the HTTF. To the greatest extent possible, the faulted components
installed in the HTTF should be those that were discovered in post-flight maintenance
inspections or at depot level maintenance. These faults that occur in the aircraft will help
the tree-structured classification algorithm to more accurately characterize the structure of
the operational aircraft.
In this thesis, all the components were intentionally faulted rather than being
components with fleet-rejected faults. This may have been one of the reasons that the
models did poorly when predicting the aircraft data. For instance, the edm fault is a small
machined slit in the gear made to seed a crack propagation. This type of fault may never
be found on an operational aircraft. If a pit in a gear exists in an operational aircraft, it is
conceivable that it would remain in the aircraft, and be classified as "no fault" data.
Installing faults discovered during maintenance would ensure that the fault would normally
be found, and should adequately be characterized by tree-structured classification.
This thesis demonstrated the usefulness of tree-structured classification in HUMS
research. Still much needs to be done to prove its ability to accurately predict faults in
operational aircraft. Since HUMS is in its infancy, it is reasonable to believe that
methodology similar to that contained in this thesis will assist in its development and
implementation.
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE OF DATA SET
The entire data set is too large to reproduce in an appendix. The data set depicted is a
sample of the entire data set showing six of the independent variables used in the final trees and
examples of all levels of the dependent variable.









583 edmthree 3.21 14.60 20.800 1.07000 15.5000 3.34
584 edmthree 3.29 13.50 22.300 1.05000 15.7000 3.55
1 no 2.53 11.30 11.400 0.44200
2 no 2.27 11.30 11.300 0.38100
3 no 2.44 20.30 10.400 0.37100
4 no 2.57 20.50 10.400 0.35000
397 edm 2.82 192.00 0.338 0.01680
398 edm 2.80 219.00 0.338 0.01920
399 edm 2.80 285.00 0.336 0.01450
400 edm 2.93 467.00 0.348 0.01800
,.6 ..8 ..0
..5 ..3 ..0
3.07 12..80 22..900 1..05000
3.26 12..80 23..100 1..04000
585 edmthree . .9 0 15.1000 3.32
586 edmthree . .1 0 15.0000 3.30
637 tooth 2.94 12.70 10.8 0.40100 13.8000 3.06
638 tooth 2.61 17.50 10.6 0.35500 14.0000 2.78
639 tooth 2.49 6.61 14.5 0.38100 18.7000 2.35
640 tooth 2.67 9.78 17.3 0.38200 16.0000 2.44
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APPENDIX B. S-PLUS TREE SUMMARIES
This appendix contains the S-Plus output for each tree model constructed. It contains
the details of the tree. Each line of the tree has the node, the split that separated the cases, the
deviance at that node, the classification of the node, and a vector with the probabilities of each
case in the node. An asterisk denotes a terminal node. Each tree corresponds to a figure in the
text of the thesis.
Figure 1
die live
1) root 215 197.500 live ( 0.17210 0.8279 )
2) systolic<92.5 20 24.430 die ( 0.70000 0.3000 )
4) systolic<76.5 6 0.000 live ( 0.00000 1.0000 ) *
5) systolic>76.5 14 0.000 die ( 1.00000 0.0000 ) *
3) systolic>92.5 195 141.500 live ( 0.11790 0.8821 )
6) age<61.9 102 0.000 live ( 0.00000 1.0000 ) *
7) age>61.9 93 104.000 live ( 0.24730 0.7527 )
14) tachrnot 65 52.280 live ( 0.13850 0.8615 )
28) age<69.6 34 15.210 live ( 0.05882 0.9412 )
56) age<62.75 5 6.730 live ( 0.40000 0.6000 ) *
57) age>62.75 29 0.000 live ( 0.00000 1.0000 ) *
29) age>69.6 31 33.120 live ( 0.22580 0.7742 )
58) systolic<114.5 16 7.481 live ( 0.06250 0.9375 )
116) age<75.7 11 0.000 live ( 0.00000 1.0000 ) *
117) age>75.7 5 5.004 live ( 0.20000 0.8000 ) *
59) systolic>114 .5 15 20.190 live ( 0.40000 0.6000 )
118) systolic<125.5 8 11.090 die ( 0.50000 0.5000 ) *
119) systolic>125.5 7 8.376 live ( 0.28570 0.7143 ) *
15) tach:present 28 38.820 die ( 0.50000 0.5000 )
30) age<75.05 22 29.770 die ( 0.59090 0.4091 )
60) systolic<106.5 6 5.407 die ( 0.83330 0.1667 ) *
61) systolic>106.5 16 22.180 die ( 0.50000 0.5000 )
122) systolic<117 6 7.638 live ( 0.33330 0.6667 ) *
123) systolic>117 10 13.460 die ( 0.60000 0.4000 )
246) systolic<129 5 6.730 die ( 0.60000 0.4000 ) *
247) systolic>129 5 6.730 die ( 0.60000 0.4000 ) *




1) root 215 197.50 live ( 0.1721 0.8279 )
2) systolic<92.5 20 24.43 die ( 0.7000 0.3000 )
4) systolic<76. 5 6 0.00 live ( 0.0000 1.0000 )
5) systolic>76.5 14 0.00 die ( 1.0000 0.0000 )
3) systolic>92.5 195 141.50 live ( 0.1179 0.8821 )
6) age<61.9 102 0.00 live ( 0.0000 1.0000 ) *
7) age>61.9 93 104.00 live ( 0.2473 0.7527 )
14) tach:not 65 52.28 live ( 0.1385 0.8615 ) *
15) tach:present 28 38.82 die ( 0.5000 0.5000
Figure 5
edm3 edm no tooth
root 640 1195.000 no ( 0.29060 0.05625 0.618800 0.034380 )
2) IR5.2<12.05 228 12.850 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 0.995600 0.004386 ) *
3) IR5.2>12.05 412 897.600 edm ( 0.45150 0.08738 0.410200 0.050970 )
6) RBE.K0.9605 371 645.200 edm ( 0.50130 0.00000 0.442000 0.056600 )
12) ISO2.2<0.055 213 222.300 edm ( 0.78400 0.00000 0.216000 0.000000 )
24) RTE.K24.05 190 144.100 edm ( 0.87370 0.00000 0.126300 0.000000 )
48) IR4.K2.825 38 52.680 edm ( 0.50000 0.00000 0.500000 0.000000 )
96) MIS3.2<0. 09305 22 17.530 edm ( 0.86360 0.00000 0.136400 0.000000 )
97) MIS3.2>0. 09305 16 0.000 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 1.000000 0.000000 ) '
49) IR4.1>2.825 152 43.980 edm ( 0.96710 0.00000 0.032890 0.000000 )
98) ISO3.2<0.0623 147 11.970 edm ( 0.99320 0.00000 0.006803 0.000000 )
99) ISO3.2>0.0623 5 5.004 no ( 0.20000 0.00000 0.800000 0.000000 ) *
25) RTE.1>24.05 23 8.227 no ( 0.04348 0.00000 0.956500 0.000000 ) *
13) ISO2.2>0.055 158 234.100 no ( 0.12030 0.00000 0.746800 0.132900 )
26) ISO3.K0.0112 17 15.840 edm ( 0.82350 0.00000 0.000000 0.176500 ) *
27) ISO3.1>0.0112 141 149.500 no ( 0.03546 0.00000 0.836900 0.127700 )
54) IR4A.2<3.805 131 102.100 no ( 0.03817 0.00000 0.900800 0.061070 ) *
55) IR4A.2>3.805 10 0.000 tooth ( 0.00000 0.00000 0.000000 1.000000 ) *
7) RBE.1>0.9605 41 30.410 edmthree ( 0.00000 0.87800 0.122000 0.000000 )
14) RAWP2P.K355.5 36 0.000 edmthree ( 0.00000 1.00000 0.000000 0.000000 )
15) RAWP2P.1>355.5 5 0.000 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 1.000000 0.000000 ) *
Figure 6
fault no fault
1) root 640 850.80 no ( 0.381200 0.61880 )
2) IR5.2<12.05 228 12.85 no ( 0.004386 0.99560 ) *
3) IR5.2>12.05 412 557.80 fault ( 0.589800 0.41020 )
6) ISO3.K0. 04395 288 307.60 fault ( 0.774300 0.22570 )
12) IG22.K15.65 59 75.56 no ( 0.339000 0.66100 )
24) IG21.2<20.3 10 0.00 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 )
25) IG21.2>20.3 49 49.59 no ( 0.204100 0.79590 ) *
13) IG22.1>15.65 229 162.10 fault { 0.886500 0.11350 )
26) IR4.K2.825 44 60.91 fault ( 0.522700 0.47730 )
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52) NB1.2<2.345 28 31.49 no ( 0.250000 0.75000 )
104) IG22.2<10.175 7 0.00 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 )
105) IG22.2>10.175 21 0.00 no ( 0.000000 1.00000 ) *
53) NB1.2>2.345 16 0.00 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 ) *
27) IR4.1>2.825 185 45.97 fault ( 0.973000 0.02703 )
54) RTE.K23.85 180 21.98 fault ( 0.988900 0.01111 ) *
55) RTE.1>23.85 5 6.73 no ( 0.400000 0.60000 ) *
7) ISO3.1>0. 04395 124 109.60 no ( 0.161300 0.83870 )
14) IR4.2<3.335 107 40.40 no ( 0.046730 0.95330 )
28) IR3A.2<0. 06205 80 0.00 no ( 0.000000 1.00000 ) *
29) IR3A.2>0. 06205 27 25.87 no ( 0.185200 0.81480 )
58) IG21.2<41.55 8 10.59 fault ( 0.625000 0.37500 ) *
59) IG21.2>41.55 19 0.00 no ( 0.000000 1.00000 ) *
15) IR4.2>3.335 17 12.32 fault ( 0.882400 0.11760 ) *
Figure 7
edm3 edm no tooth
1) root 640 1195.000 no ( 0.29090 0.05575 0.620200 0.033100 )
2) IR5.2<12 227 12.850 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 0.995200 0.004808 ) *
3) IR5.2>12 413 899.400 edm ( 0.45630 0.08743 0.407100 0.049180 )
6) RBE.K0.9605 372 646.900 edm ( 0.50760 0.00000 0.437700 0.054710 )
12) ISO2.2<0.0549 212 221.800 edm ( 0.78120 0.00000 0.218800 0.000000 )
24) RTE.K24.05 189 143.900 edm { 0.87130 0.00000 0.128700 0.000000 )
48) IR4.K2.825 38 52.710 edm ( 0.51430 0.00000 0.485700 0.000000 )
96) MIS3.2<0. 09305 22 17.530 edm ( 0.85710 0.00000 0.142900 0.000000 )
97) MIS3.2>0. 09305 16 0.000 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 1.000000 0.000000 )
49) IR4.1>2.825 151 43.970 edm ( 0.96320 0.00000 0.036760 0.000000 )
98) ISO3.2<0.0623 146 11.970 edm ( 0.99240 0.00000 0.007634 0.000000 )
99) ISO3.2>0.0623 5 5.004 no ( 0.20000 0.00000 0.800000 0.000000 ) *
25) RTE.1>24.05 23 8.236 no ( 0.04762 0.00000 0.952400 0.000000 ) *
13) ISO2.2>0.0549 160 238.900 no ( 0.12410 0.00000 0.744500 0.131400 )
26) ISO3.K0.0112 18 16.350 edm ( 0.80000 0.00000 0.000000 0.200000 ) *
27) ISO3.1>0.0112 142 150.000 no ( 0.04098 0.00000 0.836100 0.123000 )
54) IR4A.2O.805 132 102.400 no ( 0.04386 0.00000 0.894700 0.061400 ) *
55) IR4A.2>3.805 10 0.000 tooth ( 0.00000 0.00000 0.000000 1.000000 ) *
7) RBE.1>0.9605 41 30.470 edmthree ( 0.00000 0.86490 0.135100 0.000000 )
14) RAWP2P.K355.5 36 0.000 edmthree ( 0.00000 1.00000 0.000000 0.000000 ) '
15) RAWP2P.1>355.5 5 0.000 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 1.000000 0.000000 ) *
Figure 8
fault no fault
root 640 850.800 no ( 0.380900 0.61910 )
2) IR5.2<12.05 228 12.870 no ( 0.004854 0.99510 ) *
3) IR5.2>12.05 412 557.800 fault ( 0.590800 0.40920 )
6) ISO3.K0.0459 298 327.200 fault ( 0.760300 0.23970 )
12) IR4.K2.785 64 82.410 no ( 0.355900 0.64410 )
24) IG21.2<19.35 8 0.000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000
25) IG21.2>19.35 56 63.090 no ( 0.269200 0.73080 )
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50) ISO1.2<0. 01915 33 45.090 no ( 0.451600 0.54840 )
100) IG22.2<10.45 17 18.550 fault ( 0.764700 0.23530 )
101) IG22.2>10.45 16 7.501 no ( 0.071430 0.92860 ) *
51) ISO1.2>0. 01915 23 0.000 no ( 0.000000 1.00000 ) *
13) IR4.1>2.785 234 175.400 fault ( 0.875000 0.12500 )
26) RAWRMS.K24.75 216 98.300 fault ( 0.942400 0.05759 )
52) RBE.2<0.4685 21 29.320 fault ( 0.578900 0.42110 )
104) IR2.2<3.355 12 10.900 no ( 0.200000 0.80000 ) *
105) IR2.2>3.355 9 0.000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 ) *
53) RBE.2>0.4685 195 31.050 fault ( 0.982600 0.01744 )
106) IR2A.2<3.115 26 18.700 fault ( 0.863600 0.13640 ) '
107) IR2A.2>3.115 169 0.000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 )
27) RAWRMS.1>24.75 18 12.570 no ( 0.117600 0.88240 ) *
7) ISO3.1>0.0459 114 92.520 no ( 0.147100 0.85290 )
14) IR4.K5.01 102 33.810 no ( 0.043960 0.95600 ) *
15) IR4.1>5.01 12 0.000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 ) *
Figure 9
1) root 26 64.20000 no ( 0.29090 0.05575 0.620200 0.033100 )
2) IR5.2<12 18 Inf no ( 0.00000 0.00000 0.995200 0.004808 ) *
3) IR5.2>12 8 12.55000 edm ( 0.45630 0.08743 0.407100 0.049180 )
6) RBE.K0.9605 4 5.42500 edm ( 0.50760 0.00000 0.437700 0.054710 )
12) ISO2.2<0.0549 2 0.98740 edm ( 0.78120 0.00000 0.218800 0.000000 )
24) RTE.K24.05 1 0.27540 edm ( 0.87130 0.00000 0.128700 0.000000 )
48) IR4.K2.825 0.00000 edm ( 0.51430 0.00000 0.485700 0.000000 )
96) MIS3.2-C0. 09305 0.00000 edm ( 0.85710 0.00000 0.142900 0.000000 ) *
97) MIS3.2>0. 09305 0.00000 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 1.000000 0.000000 ) *
49) IR4.1>2.825 1 0.07492 edm ( 0.96320 0.00000 0.036760 0.000000 )
98) ISO3.2<0.0623 1 0.01533 edm ( 0.99240 0.00000 0.007634 0.000000 ) *
99) ISO3.2>0.0623 0.00000 no ( 0.20000 0.00000 0.800000 0.000000 ) *
25) RTE.1>24.05 1 6.08900 no ( 0.04762 0.00000 0.952400 0.000000 ) *
13) ISO2.2>0.0549 2 8.34700 no ( 0.12410 0.00000 0.744500 0.131400 )
26) ISO3.K0.0112 1 0.44630 edm ( 0.80000 0.00000 0.000000 0.200000 ) *
27) ISO3.1>0.0112 1 6.38900 no ( 0.04098 0.00000 0.836100 0.123000 )
54) IR4A.2O.805 1 6.25400 no ( 0.04386 0.00000 0.894700 0.061400 ) *
55) IR4A.2>3.805 0.00000 tooth ( 0.00000 0.00000 0.000000 1.000000 ) *
7) RBE.1>0.9605 4 Inf edmthree ( 0.00000 0.86490 0.135100 0.000000 )
14) RAWP2P.K355.5 4 Inf edmthree ( 0.00000 1.00000 0.000000 0.000000 ) *
15) RAWP2P.1>355.5 0.00000 no ( 0.00000 0.00000 1.000000 0.000000 ) *
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Figure 10
root 26 50.20000 no ( 0.380900 0.61910 )
2) IR5.2<12.05 18 191.80000 no ( 0.004854 0.99510 ) *
3) IR5.2>12.05 8 8.42100 fault { 0.590800 0.40920 )
6) ISO3.K0.0459 5 2.74000 fault ( 0.760300 0.23970 )
12) IR4.K2.785 2 4.13200 no ( 0.355900 0.64410 )
24) IG21.2<19.35 0.00000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 ) *
25) IG21.2>19.35 2 5.24900 no ( 0.269200 0.73080 )
50) ISO1.2<0. 01915 0.00000 no ( 0.451600 0.54840 )
100) IG22.2<10.45 0.00000 fault ( 0.764700 0.23530
101) IG22.2>10.45 0.00000 no ( 0.071430 0.92860 ) *
51) ISO1.2>0. 01915 2 Inf no ( 0.000000 1.00000 ) *
13) IR4.1>2.785 3 0.80120 fault ( 0.875000 0.12500 )
26) RAWRMS.K24.75 2 0.23730 fault ( 0.942400 0.05759 )
52) RBE.2<0.4685 0.00000 fault ( 0.578900 0.42110 )
104) IR2.2<3.355 0.00000 no ( 0.200000 0.80000 ) *
105) IR2.2>3.355 0.00000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 )
53) RBE.2>0.4685 2 0.07038 fault ( 0.982600 0.01744 )
106) IR2A.2<3.115 2 0.58640 fault ( 0.863600 0.13640
107) IR2A.2>3.115 0.00000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000
27) RAWRMS.1>24.75 1 4.28000 no ( 0.117600 0.88240 ) *
7) ISO3.1>0.0459 3 11.50000 no ( 0.147100 0.85290 )
14) IR4.K5.01 3 18.75000 no ( 0.043960 0.95600 ) *
15) IR4.1>5.01 0.00000 fault ( 1.000000 0.00000 ) *
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APPENDIX C. S-PLUS CODE FOR HEURISTIC
The following code produces 'iter' trees from data set ldf using a stratified random
sample of fifty percent of the data. Note that this code is not generic, in that the levels of the
independent variable must be written into the code with their appropriate order in the S-plus
data frame. The fifty percent sample is coded using the size parameter of the sample function in
S-plus. To modify this function to a use different data set or sample a different proportion of
the data, the appropriate lines must be recoded. Explanation of code is preceded by # and
follows the code it explains.
function (df = modell.dat, iter = 2)
<
tree . misclass .vector <- vector (length = iter)
predict. misclass.vector <- vector ( length = iter)
split. variable. vector <- vector (length = iter)
# creates vectors to hold the TMR, PMR andfirst splitting variablefor each
# tree
smallest. predict. error <- -1
smallest. fif .error <- -1
for (count in l:iter) {
nofault. sample <- sample (1 : 396 , size = 198)
edm. sample <- sample (397 : 582 , size = 93)
edmthree. sample <- sample (583: 618 , size = 18)
tooth. sample <- sample (619 : 640, size = 11)
# randomly samples half the datafor each level of the dependent
# variable
tree. sim. full <- tree(df[c (nofault. sample, edm. sample,
edmthree . sample , tooth . sample)
, ]
)
tree. sim <- prune. tree (tree. sim. full , best = 10)
# grows andprunes treefrom the randomly sampled data
sts <- summary (tree. sim)
tree .misclass . vector [count] <- sts$misclass [1] /sts$misclass [2]
split. variable. vector [count] <- sts$used[l]
# saves the TMR andfirst splitting variable into their respective vectors
pt <- predict. tree (tree. sim, newdata = df [ - c (nofault. sample,
edm. sample, edmthree . sample , tooth . sample) ,] , type =
"tree")
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# applies remaining halfof the data to the treefor prediction
spt <- summary (pt)
predict. misclass. vector [count] <- spt$misclass [1 ] /spt$misclass [2]
# saves the PMR into its vector
tree. predict. error <- predict .misclass. vector [count]
tree. fif .error <- 0.5 * tree. misclass. vector [count] + 0.5 *
predict . misclass .vector [ count
]
# computes the two 'measures ofgoodness
'
if (smallest. predict. error < |
|
tree. predict. error < smallest. predict. error) {
best .predict . tree <- tree.sim
smallest. predict. error <- tree. predict. error
best. predict. tmr <- tree . misclass . vector [ count
)
best. predict.pmr <- predict. misclass.vector [count]
best. predict. error <- tree. predict. error
}
# comparesfirst 'measure ofgoodness ' ofcurrent tree to 'best ' and
# saves current tree as best ifapplicable
if (smallest. fif .error < II tree . fif . error < smallest. fif .error) {
best. fif . tree <- tree.sim
smallest. fif .error <- tree. fif .error
best. fif. tmr <- tree .misclass . vector [count
]
best. fif .pmr <- predict. misclass .vector [count]
best. fif .error <- tree. fif .error
}
# compares second 'measure ofgoodness ' ofcurrent tree to 'best ' and
# saves current tree as best ifapplicable
}
list (tmr = tree. misclass. vector, pmr = predict. misclass. vector , first =
split .variable.vector , tree. fif =best. fif . tree, tree. predict =
best. predict. tree, tree. fif. tmr = best. fif. tmr, tree. fif .pmr =
best. fif .pmr, error. fif = best. fif .error, tree. predict. tmr =
best. predict. tmr, tree. predict. pmr = best. predict. pmr
,
error.predict = best. predict. error)
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